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DEREK BOK AND THE MERGER OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Both the novelty and the uniqueness of the "law and econom-
ics" movement of the last fifteen years have been greatly exag-
gerated. Law and economics has been with us for at least a half 
century, in nearly every area of private and public law.1 The 
most outspoken protagonists of law and economics admit that 
economics had a presence in antitrust and regulatory policy long 
before the work of Ronald Coase, Lester Telser, and others in-
spired its expanded use in areas of private law, such as tort and 
contract. 2 But even then, some of those who would make such an 
admission would argue that the courts developed a uniquely "ec-
onomic approach"3 to antitrust only in the late seventies, and, 
since that time, have applied it only haltingly." 
• Professor of Law, Faculty Scholar, University of Iowa College of Law. Thanks to 
Professors Thomas E. Kauper and Louis B. Schwartz for reading a draft. 
1. See, e.g., J. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1924); R. ELY, PROPERTY 
AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATIONS TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH (1914); Ave-Lalle-
mant, Critique of a Revision of Some Fundamental Economic Concepts, 18 MARQ. L. 
REV. 20 (1933); Commons, Law and Economics, 34 YALE L.J. 371 (1925); Commons, The 
Problem of Correlating Law, Economics and Ethics, 8 Wis. L. REV. 3 (1932); Dawson & 
Cooper, The Effect of Infi,ation on Private Contracts: United States, 1861-1879, 33 
MICH. L. REV. 706, 852 (1935); Groat, Economic Wage and Legal Wage, 33 YALE L.J. 489 
(1924); Healy, Economic Surplus and the Law, 6 DICTA 15 (1928); Heilman, The Corre-
lation Between the Sciences of Law and Economics, 20 CALIF. L. REV. 379 (1932); Heil-
man, Judicial Method and Economic Objectives in Confi,ict of Laws, 43 YALE L.J. 1082 
(1934); Humble, Economics from a Legal Standpoint, 42 AM. L. REv. 379 (1908); Licht-
man, Economics, the Basis of Law, 61 AM. L. REV. 357 (1927); Richberg, Economic Illu-
sion Underlying Law, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 96 (1933); Richberg, The Supreme Court Dis-
cusses Value, 37 HARV. L. REV. 289 (1924); Solterer, Relations Between Economics and 
Juridical Science, 21 GEO. L.J. 9 (1932). 
2. Economic analysis of property and contract has been common since the beginning 
of the century. See, e.g., the works by Ely and by Commons, supra note 1. 
3. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Refi,ections on the Syl-
vania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1977). 
4. See, e.g., Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 972 (1986); Gerhart, The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Tri-
umph of the Chicago School, 1982 SuP. CT. REv. 319; see also Kaplow, Antitrust, Law 
and Economics, and the Courts, LAW AND CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1987, at 181 (argu-
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Any notion that courts first adopted an economic approach to 
questions of antitrust policy in the late 1970's is historically my-
opic. What they really did was discard one particular economic 
model-a model heavily influenced by Harvard economist Ed-
ward Chamberlin's The Theory of Monopolistic Competition5 
and Harvard industrial organization economist Joe Bain's Barri-
ers to New Competition8-and replace it with a more tradi-
tional, distinctively neoclassical, economic model, inspired most 
directly by the followers of Alfred Marshall, whose Principles of 
Economics' carried traditional British neoclassicism to its apo-
gee in 1890. 8 
Derek Bok's well-known and influential article on merger pol-
icy and economics,9 published in 1960, advocated an economic 
approach to one particular area of federal antitrust policy, albeit 
a different approach from the one that Professor Richard Posner 
began to advocate·a decade or so later.1° Bok's approach was dif-
ferent, not because it was not "economic," but because it was 
based on a different set of economic assumptions, many of which 
would lose favor with a later generation of economists. At least 
one recent writer has suggested that Bok's Section 7 inaugu-
rated a "first wave" of economic analysis in American merger 
policy, while the rise of the Chicago School and the publication 
of the revised Justice Department Merger Guidelines in 1982 
signalled a second wave.11 
But more than economics guided Bok's Section 7. Bok at-
tempted to forge a merger policy that was sensitive to Congres-
sional concerns about rising concentration and injury to small 
business, as well as to more economic concerns about monopoly 
pricing.12 Ultimately, those two policies proved mutually incon-
ing that the law and economics revolution has not influenced the Supreme Court nearly 
as much as the underlying political commitments of its justices). 
5. E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1933). 
6. J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956); see also Bain, Economies of Scale, 
Concentration, and Condition of Entry in Twenty Manufacturing Industries, 44 AM. 
ECON. REV. 15 (1954). 
7. A. MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1890). 
8. See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 219-23 
(1985). 
9. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 
HARV. L. REV. 226 (1960). 
10. E.g., R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 78-134 (1976); Pos-
ner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 
(1969). 
11. Fox, Introduction: The 1982 Merger Guidelines: When Economists are Kings?, 
71 CALIF. L. REV. 281, 281 (1983). 
12. See infra text accompanying notes 62-65. 
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sistent. By trying to follow both, the Warren Court's merger pol-
icy became irrational and inconsistent, but only a small part of 
the blame for that development can be laid at the feet of Derek 
Bok. He had assigned himself the task-one of the most difficult 
for any economic policymaker in a democracy13-of harmonizing 
the-economic theory of his day with the manifestly noneconomic 
concerns of Congress. That he took both of these problems seri-
ously is a tribute to his fidelity to the American principles of 
government, if not to the merger policy that resulted. 
Legislative intent aside, the perceived economic problem of 
mergers had become unruly and, some believed, intractable by 
1960. Derek Bok's Section 7 attempted to make merger policy 
rational within the confines of an economic model that had 
grown so complex that no court could ever hope to measure all 
the factors that might be relevant to evaluating the competitive 
consequences of a merger. Importantly, Bok did not challenge 
the model itself in any fundamental way. Like Edward 
Chamberlin,14 Joe Bain,111 Carl Kaysen, and Donald Turner,16 
the members of the 1955 Attorney General's National Commit-
tee to study the Antitrust Laws,17 and many leading 1940's and 
1950's economists, 18 Derek Bok entertained a certain suspicion 
of the power of the "invisible hand" of the marketplace to deter-
mine optimal industry structure, price, and output.19 To be sure, 
that suspicion was tempered a good deal, and Bok believed that 
Congress was excessively concerned about the impact of mergers 
on small, less efficient businesses. Nevertheless, he concluded 
that mergers should be condemned at much smaller market-
share levels than would generally result in condemnation today. 
In addition, Bok developed a set of simple presumptive merger 
tests, based on his own strong feelings that the economic consid-
13. See Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 249-55. 
14. See supra note 5. 
15. See supra note 6. 
16. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 
(1959); see infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. 
17. See ATTORNEY GEN.'S NAT'L CoMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS, U.S. DEP'T. OF 
JusT., REPORT (1955) [hereinafter REPORT]. For information on the origin and writing of 
that Report, see T. KOVALEFF, BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT DURING THE EISENHOWER Ao-
MINISTRATION: A STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST POLICY OF THE ANTITRUST DIVISION OF THE Jus-
TICE DEPARTMENT 17-49 (1980); Hovenkamp, Book Review, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 755 (1982) 
(reviewing Kovaleff's book). 
18. For names and specific works, see Bok, supra note 9, passim. 
19. The principal sources of industrial organization and price theory upon which Bok 
relied were J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1959); w. FELLNER, COMPETITION AMONG 
THE FEw (1949); and F. MACHLUP, THE ECONOMICS OF SELLERS' COMPETITION (1952). 
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erations at issue in merger cases had become too complex to be 
taken into account in any comprehensive way in litigation. 
The result was a merger policy that was both administratively 
simple and hostile to many mergers that would be considered 
quite harmless by 1980's standards. Moreover, many subsequent 
judicial decisions cited Bok's work,20 several of which are consid-
ered flawed in some fundamental way by many antitrust schol-
ars today. Then Assistant Professor Bok21 clearly did not intend 
all of these results. 
II. THE ECONOMIC MODEL OF BoK'S SECTION 7 
Merger policy both before and during the Warren Court era 
was guided by different values and assumptions from today. 
However, the assumptions were not altogether as different as 
they have been described in some Chicago School literature; 
they certainly are not as grotesque and pernicious as the view 
painted in Robert Bork's The Antitrust Paradox, 22 which sug-
gests that 1960's merger policy was concerned predominantly 
with condemning mergers because they produced efficiencies 
and injured smaller, less efficient competitors as a result. Former 
Judge Bork would have us believe that, during the Warren era, 
mergers that benefitted consumers were generally illegal, while 
mergers that injured consumers while benefitting competitors 
were generally quite legal. To be sure, some cases, particularly 
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 23 are consistent with that 
proposition, but the threat of monopoly pricing was an impor-
tant concern of 1960's merger policy, just as it is today. 
The chief differences between that merger policy and the pol-
icy of the 1980's are: (1) the 1960's economic model for antitrust 
analysis had less confidence that the market itself would disci-
pline firms and force them to behave competitively; and (2) al-
though the threat of monopoly pricing was an important concern 
of 1960's merger policy, it was not the exclusive concern; the 
courts tried to be attentive to Congress's directive, manifested in 
the legislative history of section 7 of the Clayton Act, to protect 
"competition" by preserving small business.24 
20. See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text. 
21. He is now president of Harvard University. 
22. · R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 198-262 (1978). 
23. 370 U.S. 294 (1962); see also infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text. 
24. See H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949) (discussing proposed 
amendments to § 7). 
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A. The Revolt Against Classicism 
Dominant economic theory from the New Deal and the 1940's 
was characterized by a deep distrust of the unregulated market, 
undoubtedly influenced by the Great Depression of the 1930's. 
The seminal work of economic theory symbolizing this distrust 
was Edward Chamberlin's The Theory of Monopolistic Compe-
tition, published in 1933. 211 The great evil in Chamberlin's eco-
nomic model was product differentiation, which permitted mod-
ern manufacturing firms to avoid head-to-head competition with 
one another. Once a firm produced a product that was somehow 
different in the eyes of consumers from the products made by its 
competitors, the firm could count on a certain group of custom-
ers who preferred its particular brand and were willing to pay a 
premium for it. As a result, the firm faced a downward sloping 
demand curve similar to the monopolist's demand curve, al-
though not as steep, rather than the horizontal demand curve 
faced by the perfect competitor.26 
However, the firm in Chamberlin's model was not really a 
"monopolist" in the pure sense-that is, it was not a firm that 
could set its price and output free of concern about the decisions 
of others. On the contrary, it faced many competitors with capa-
bilities equal to its own. As a result, the firm competed by at-
tempting to enhance the degree of product differentiation be-
tween its own offerings and those of other firms. It did this 
through stylistic or other frivolous innovations that would not 
have been considered cost-justified in a more perfectly competi-
tive market. It also offered a host of services that were not com-
petitively justified. It integrated vertically in order to place its 
own brand more prominently than others in front of the con-
sumer. Perhaps most importantly, it engaged in outrageous 
amounts of advertising that exaggerated the difference between 
its own offering and those of its competitors, as well as the 
higher quality of its own product. 
The result of all of this activity was not particularly favorable 
to anyone except, perhaps, to the firm's design engineers and ad-
vertising executives. Output was lower and prices were higher 
than they would have been under perfect competition, but as a 
general rule, the firms in these product-differentiated markets 
did not earn monopoly profits. They spent most of their antici-
25. E. CHAMBERLIN, supra note 5. 
26. See H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 1-39 (1985). 
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pated monopoly returns on the excessive innovation, advertising, 
and other extraordinary efforts necessary to create and maintain 
the consumer perception that they had something unique to sell. 
Furthermore, they chronically carried wasteful excess capacity 
because they did not operate as price takers, but were constantly 
reducing output to a perceived profit-maximizing level. "Monop-
olistic competition" was the worst of both worlds: monopoly 
price and output, but only competitive rates of return.27 
Like most elegant models that appear to explain just about 
everything, the theory of monopolistic competition influenced 
many subsequent thinkers who refined, extrapolated from, or 
critiqued the basic model. Much of the price theory and indus-
trial organization literature of the 1930's, 1940's, and 1950's was 
of this sort, and the implications for antitrust policy were plain 
enough.28 Essentially, these implications can be summarized as: 
(1) A feeling that not all product differentiation, advertising, or 
even innovation is in the best interest of consumers or the econ-
omy; some of it may be quite pernicious; (2) A belief that non-
competitive performance could result at much lower concentra-
tion levels than previously thought necessary, and that no 
"agreement" among the firms was necessary to produce this bad 
result; simple monopolistic "competition" among firms was suffi-
cient; and (3) A much broader belief than before that large firms 
behave "strategically"-most particularly, that they design and 
price products not to please customers, but because certain price 
or innovation decisions might deter or delay entry by other 
competitors. 
The monopolistic competition paradigm remained relatively 
robust in academic writing on antitrust policy, even as econo-
mists were becoming more critical of its underlying assumptions. 
For example, in the introduction to their influential 1959 book 
27. For a more complete discussion of monopolistic competition, see R. ROBINSON, 
COLUMBIA ESSAYS ON GREAT ECONOMISTS: EDWARD H. CHAMBERLIN (1971); A. THOMPSON, 
JR., ECONOMICS OF THE FIRM (4th ed. 1985); G. TuLLOCK, TOWARD A MATHEMATICS OF 
POLITICS 62-81 (1967). 
28. See, e.g., STAFF OF TEMPORARY NAT'L ECONOMIC COMM., 76TH CONG., 3D SEss., IN-
VESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER: ANTITRUST IN ACTION (Senate 
Comm. Print 1941) (Monograph written by W. Hamilton and I. Till); STAFF OF TEMPO-
RARY NAT'L ECONOMIC COMM., 76TH CONG., 3D SESS., INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF 
ECONOMIC POWER: COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY (Senate Comm. 
Print 1940) (Monograph written by C. Wilcox); A. BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION 
(1936); R. TRIFFIN, MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY 
(1940); Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. EcoN. REV. 241 
(1940). Admiring, but nevertheless critical, are J. ScHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM 
AND DEMOCRACY 79 (1942); 1 J. SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES: A THEORETICAL, HISTORI-
CAL, AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CAPITALIST PROCESS 65 (1939). 
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on antitrust policy,29 Carl Kaysen and Donald F. Turner 
adopted.a set of assumptions heavily influenced by the monopo-
listic competition paradigm.30 The less academic but equally in-
fluential Report of the Attorney General's National Committee 
to Study the Antitrust Laws31 implicitly made the same as-
sumptions, 32 although it shows some influence from economists, 
such as John Maurice Clark, who had become increasingly criti-
cal of the monopolistic competition model. 33 
The 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendments that expanded the 
coverage of section 7 of the Clayton Act had at least a few ideo-
logical roots in the same garden. As Bok noted, the amendments 
were not designed merely to close one or two "loopholes" in the 
original Clayton Act merger provision of 1914.34 Rather, Con-
gress intended "to create a new statutory formula for determin-
ing the legality of mergers. "311 Bok traced the impetus for the 
Celler-Kefauver amendments back to writing on economics and 
the corporation from the New Deal Era,36 particularly to Adolph 
Berle and Gardiner Means's The Modern Corporation and Pri-
vate Property, written in 1932, which drew an ominous picture 
of the large corporation's search for size for its own sake, in spite 
of productive as well as allocative inefficiencies. 37 For example, 
because the ownership and control of the corporation had be-
come functionally separated from one another, management 
could no longer be trusted to maximize the corporation's profits 
and might wish instead to maximize its gross revenues, its mar-
ket share, the number of markets in which it did business, or 
some other measure of managerial success. The result was a 
trend toward concentration unjustified by the natural, efficiency-
generating forces of the neoclassical marketplace. Together, 
Chamberlin's Monopolistic Competition and Berle and Means's 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property signalled the 
death of the "classical" corporation and its replacement by a 
29. C. KAYSEN AND D. TURNER, supra note 16. 
30. Id. at 7-9. 
31. REPORT, supra note 17. 
32. See id. at 315-40. 
33. See id. at 337-39. 
34. Bok, supra note 9, at 306. The loopholes were that the original § 7: (1) applied 
only to stock acquisitions, not to asset acquisitions; and (2) prohibited only those merg-
ers tending to eliminate competition "between" the merging firms-thus suggesting ap-
plication only to horizontal and perhaps potential-competition mergers, but not to verti-
cal mergers. 
35. Id. (citing D. MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON ACT 267 (1959)). 
36. See id. at 230-31. 
37. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 10-
46 (1932). 
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corporation whose activities were much more intensively scruti-
nized and regulated by the State. 38 
This economic perspective resulted in an immense concern ex-
pressed in federal agency publications of the next two decades 
over perceived growth in corporate concentration, which was 
more or less assumed to be bad per se. 39 Derek Bok did not 
make the same assumption, agreeing rather with an important 
1950 study by Lintner and Butters that most of the recent merg-
ers had involved relatively small companies and had not been 
particularly anticompetitive. 40 At the same time, he noted that 
Congress had assumed that concentration was rising, and that 
this was bad for competition. He concluded that Congress's in-
tentions must be honored, even if they were based on a faulty 
premise.41 
Critics of monopolistic competition,42 The Modern Corpora-
tion and Private Property, and their progeny have argued that 
they were based on faulty assumptions, failed to make reliable 
predictions, or had very little influence on economic theory.43 
Some of this criticism in the antitrust literature of the Right has 
to be classified as purely rhetorical, for it simply asserts the con-
trary as if it were truth carried down from the top of the 
mountain. 44 
In fact, as a model of market behavior, the theory of monopo-
listic competition has held up quite well and is probably as con-
sistent with the data as is the Chicago School neoclassical model. 
The same generally must be said of the Berle and Means thesis. 
What it asserts is perhaps ultimately unprovable, because there 
38. See Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. 
L.J. 1593, 1672-74 (1988). 
39. See Bok, supra note 9, at 231. 
40. See id. at 231-32 (citing Lintner & Butters, Effect of Mergers on Industrial Con-
centration, 1940-1947, 32 REV. EcoN. & STATISTICS 30 (1950) (concluding that the post-
War merger movement generally was not harmful to competition)); see also E. MAsoN, 
ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM 16-43 (1957) (reaching the same 
conclusion as Lintner and Butters); Adelman, The Measurement of Industrial Concen-
tration, 33 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 269 (1951) (concluding that concentration may actu-
ally have declined). 
41. Bok, supra note 9, at 234. 
42. See, e.g., G. STIGLER, Monopolistic Competition in Retrospect, in THE ORGANIZA-
TION OF INDUSTRY 309-21 (1983). Other literature is summarized in F. SCHERER, INDUS-
TRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE & EcoNOMIC PERFORMANCE 385-89 (2d ed. 1980). 
43. See, e.g., G. STIGLER, supra note 42, at 309-21; Hessen, The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property: A Reappraisal, 26 J.L. AND EcoN. 273, 275-78 (1983); Stigler & 
Friedland, The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 
237 (1983). 
44. See, e.g., D. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY: ANATOMY OF A POLICY FAIL-
URE 30-32 (1982). 
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is a mountain of evidence pointing in inconsistent directions. 
But even critics of Berle and Means cite evidence that tends to 
establish their point: for example, the management of a takeover 
target will frequently go tQ extraordinary lengths to resist, in 
spite of the fact that their corporation and its shareholders will 
benefit from the takeover.0 
The one distinct advantage of neoclassicism over monopolistic 
competition is simplicity, in two different senses. First, the neo-
classical model, particularly the hard-core Chicago School 
model, tends to see no great difference in the behavior of prod-
uct-differentiated and undifferentiated firms-or, at least it sees 
much less difference than Chamberlin did. The result is that the 
neoclassical model purports to generalize about market behavior 
in a much broader way than the monopolistic competition model 
does. For example, the simple assumption that price approaches 
marginal cost, even in product-differentiated markets, is far 
stronger within the neoclassical model. This makes the neoclas-
sical model more elegant, but not necessarily better for the anti-
trust policymaker searching for "right" answers. In the same 
sense, the Newtonian model of physical motion is simpler and 
more unified than the general theory of relativity. But in certain 
situations-as when one is seeking to measure the location of a 
star or plot the trajectory of an interplanetary space probe-the 
Newtonian model produces incorrect results.46 
The neoclassical model is also simpler in a second important 
sense: it purports to make more confident and optimistic predic-
tions about market behavior in the absence of regulatory inter-
vention, including antitrust intervention. The neoclassical model 
concludes that the minimally regulated market works quite well, 
while monopolistic competition draws the much more pessmistic 
conclusion that frequent governmental constraint is necessary to 
maintain price, output, and product quality at the socially opti-
mal level. In short, the neoclassical model yields a much simpler, 
more manageable agenda for the economic policy maker than 
does monopolistic competition. Bok's Section 7, written well 
before the Chicago School revolution in antitrust economics, at-
tempted to devise a simplified, more consistent antitrust policy 
within the confines of what had, by 1960, become a substantially 
modified monopolistic competition model. 
45. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 
MICH. L. REV. 1155 (1982). 
46. See S. HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 10 (1988). 
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B. Bok's Section 7 and the Problem of Congressional Intent 
Even economic models developed in the era of monopolistic 
competition purported to distinguish between efficiency and dis-
tributive concerns. Within such models, one was concerned 
about mergers because of their impact on "competition," eco-
nomically defined. Thus, for example, a merger would be con-
demned because it tended to enhance the power of the post-
merger firm to raise price above marginal cost. The 
determinants of that question were far more complex than they 
were within the classical or neoclassical models, and the poli-
cymaker in the age of monopolistic competition had far less con-
fidence in the unregulated market than neoclassicists before and 
after. But the basic questions were more or less the same. 
Many of the impulses reflected by Congress when it amended 
section 7 of the Clayton Act in 1950 were not guided by any 
economic model, but by the political agendas of the people who 
debated and voted on the new statute. Some of these impulses 
were manifestly "anticompetitive." For example, Congress was 
concerned that, to the extent that a merger increased a firm's 
efficiency by enabling it to reduce the costs of some input or 
operation, smaller competitors would be injured. These competi-
tors were a political constituency that Congress clearly deemed 
worthy of protection. As a result, several suggestions appear in 
the legislative history that efficiency-creating mergers should be 
condemned, not because of their impact on consumers, which 
even under the Chamberlinian model would have been positive, 
but because they would injure smaller rivals;" 
The great hostility toward mergers expressed in the 1950 Cel-
ler-Kefauver amendments rested, then, on two platforms: (1) a 
factual assumption, increasingly criticized by 1950's era econo-
mists, that America had experienced a recent, dramatic, and an-
ticompetitive increase in corporate concentration;'8 and (2) a set 
of political, or distributive, concerns generally inconsistent with 
47. See, e.g., 96 CONG. REC. 16,433 (1950) (statements of Sen. O'Conor); 95 CONG. REC. 
11,486 (1949) (statements of Rep. Celler). During the debate on the amendments to §§ 7 
and 11 of the Clayton Act, Representative Celler stated: 
Id. 
Small, independent, decentralized business of the kind that built up our coun-
try, of the kind that made our country great, first, is fast disappearing, and sec-
ond, is being made dependent upon monster concentration. 
It is very difficult now for small business to compete against the financial, 
purchasing, and advertising power of the mammoth coprorations. 
48. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. 
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economic efficiency. The latter overwhelmed the legislative his-
tory. To anyone preoccupied "with the economic consequences 
of monopoly power," wrote Bok, "the curious aspect of the de-
bates is the paucity of remarks having to do with the effects of 
concentration on prices, innovation, distribution, and effi-
ciency.""9 The word "competition" in the debates "appeared to 
possess a strong socio-political connotation which centered on 
the virtues of the small entrepreneur to an extent seldom dupli-
cated in economic literature."110 
Bok recognized the value of these noneconomic concerns in 
the Celler-Kefauver Amendments and attempted to take them 
seriously. He noted that "although truth is the preeminent aim 
of economic study it can be only one of several goals in law."111 
But he responded to the expressed concerns of Congress in an 
odd, inconsistent way that was to have a pernicious influence on 
later Supreme Court opinions,'12 as well as those of lower courts. 
In trying to be sensitive to both economic theory and the Con-
gressional mandate, Bok first minimized the benefits that might 
accrue from increased efficiency-assuming in the process that 
such efficiencies, if they were to be found, were a good thing. 
Then, in a set of inconsistent arguments, he treated the efficien-
cies that might result from mergers as if they were obvious and, 
at least under some circumstances, anticompetitive. 
In responding to the economic arguments in favor of permit-
ting relatively substantial mergers because of their efficiency-
creating potential, Bok answered that the cost savings that could 
be achieved through merger could also be achieved through in-
ternal expansion.113 Further, since horizontal mergers involve the 
acquisition of existing plants, and not the construction of newer 
or larger ones, they simply do not generate the kinds of intra-
plant economies that Bok believed were most important. 
Bok generally adopted the view of economies of scale ex-
pressed in Bain's influential · Barriers to New Competition, 
which had concluded that: (1) the principal kind of scale econ-
omy relevant to antitrust policy was the single-plant production 
economy; and (2) in most industries, all the important econo-
mies of scale could be attained at relatively small market shares, 
49. Bok, supra note 9, at 236. 
50. Id. at 236-37. 
51. Id. at 227-28. 
52. Notably, FTC v. Procter and Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967). See infra notes 
73-75 and accompanying text. 
53. Bok, supra note 9, at 319. 
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most generally on the order of five percent or less.64 Bok dis-
cussed multiplant economies, which can be created by merger, 
only briefly but concluded that they could be achieved by alter-
native routes, such as expansion, contracting out, or joint ven-
ture.66 He finally determined that "[t]here is little basis for con-
cluding that the achievement of lower costs as such should give 
rise to favored treatment under section 7,"66 but he based his 
conclusion on the intent of Congress, which he felt obliged to 
follow, rather than on economics. In this case, "[t]he possibility 
of lower costs was brushed aside in the legislative deliberations," 
and there was "every reason to believe that Congress preferred 
the noneconomic advantages of deconcentrated markets to lim-
ited reductions in the cost of operations. "67 
In the second related but inconsistent set of arguments, Bok 
appeared to concede substantial efficiencies that might result 
from mergers but regarded them as harmful when they occurred. 
For example, he appeared to approve of the government's argu-
ment in the Brillo case that a challenged merger would produce 
substantial cost reductions, the result of which would "divert 
substantial business from the other companies," as well as 
Brillo's argument, in response, that the merger was harmless be-
cause it was not particularly efficient and the postmerger firm 
would not steal customers from anyone. 68 Bok found the issue of 
"whether lower prices in this context would be harmful or bene-
ficial to the public interest" to be full of "difficulties," -but the 
difficulties he cited were ones of proof rather than principle. 69 
For example, he suggested that it would be very difficult to es-
tablish whether the benefits that low prices produced for con-
sumers outweighed the injuries that would accrue to competi-
tors.60 Later, he suggested that "critical cost savings may give a 
merger far greater significance than its size would imply"61 and 
thus justify quicker condemnation. 
54. See Bok, supra note 9, at 329 (citing J. BAIN, supra note 6, at 53-113). 
55. Id. at 319 & n.278. 
56. Id. at 318. 
57. Id. (citing 95 CONG. REC. 11,486 (1949) (remarks of Rep. Celler) and 95 CONG. 
REC. 11,496 (1949) (remarks of Rep. Boggs)). • 
58. Id. at 265 (summarizing the arguments made by both sides during the portion of 
the Brillo litigation that occurred prior to the publication of Bok's article). For back-
ground on that part of the Brillo litigation, see Brillo Mfg. Co., [1957-1958 Transfer 
Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 11 27,243 (May 23, 1958); Brillo Mfg. Co., [1959-1960 
Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 11 28,667 (Mar. 25, 1960). 
59. Bok, supra note 9, at 265. 
60. See id. at 265-66. 
61. Id. at 278. 
SUMMER 1988] Law and Economics 527 
When Bok developed his own presumptive standards, he 
stated a concern with mergers "which lower costs, increase fi-
nancial strength, or otherwise enhance the power of the leader, 
since all such acquisitions might encourage or facilitate domina-
tion of rival firms."62 Ambiguously, he suggested that mergers 
that lower production or transportation costs are socially benefi-
cial,63 while those that facilitate larger advertising or promo-
tional budgets, or larger stockholder dividends, are harmful.64 In 
fact, his principal concern in the development of market share 
standards for the acquiring firm was not the ability of the post-
merger firm to raise price above marginal cost, but rather its 
ability to "dominate" rivals. That is, he tended to regard even 
the horizontal merger as an "exclusionary" practice, rather than 
one that merely facilitated the exercise of the power to raise 
prices to anticompetitive levels.6~ 
Such indecisiveness about efficiency helped to produce the 
terrible schizophrenia in 1960's merger cases concerning the ap-
propriate role of cost savings. Only the most ham-handed analy-
sis would condemn mergers precisely because they produced cost 
savings that might injure competitors-but a few decisions even 
did that. In Federal Trade Commission v. Procter and Gam-
ble, 66 which condemned a potential competition merger between 
a household chemical producer and a liquid bleach manufac-
turer, Justice Douglas drew the fairly innocuous conclusion that 
"[p]ossible economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality," 
because Congress had "struck the balance in favor of protecting 
competition."67 The Court noted that one effect of the merger 
was that the postmerger Clorox Company could take advantage 
of multiproduct advertising discounts unavailable to competitors 
that produced only liquid bleach;68 but the merger was actually 
condemned under an early version of the "potential competi-
tion" doctrine69 because it reduced the potential for competition 
that might have occurred had Procter and Gamble entered the 
bleach market by building its own new plant.70 
62. Id. at 276. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 321. 
65. See infra text accompanying note 105. 
66. 386 U.S. 568 (1967). 
67. Id. at 580. 
68. Id. at 573-74. 
69. See VP. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ,m 1116-1126, at 69-161 (1980); H. 
HoVENKAMP, supra note 26, § 12.4, at 328. 
70. See 386 U.S. at 581. 
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Some lower courts were less circumspect. For example, in Al-
lis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. White Consolidated Indus-
tries, 71 the Third Circuit granted a preliminary injunction 
against a conglomerate merger between a company that made 
electric equipment and one that made steel mills because the 
merger would produce a company with the unique advantage 
that it would manufacture a fully wired mill, ready to operate. 
The court believed that this would give the firm an unfair com-
petitive advantage over others in the market.72 Likewise, in Pu-
rex Corp. v. Proctor and Gamble,73 a private antitrust action 
based on the same merger that was condemned by the Supreme 
Court in Federal Trade Commission v. Procter and Gamble,1 • 
the court opined that the plaintiff, a rival bleach manufacturer, 
might recover damages based on injuries that accrued to it be-
cause of the acquired firm's increased efficiency. "Although such 
economies may be unobjectionable in isolation," the court con-
cluded, "they may be the basis of . . . liability if they serve as 
part of the mechanism by which an illegal merger lessens compe-
tition."75 The court did not explain how efficiencies might lessen 
competition; how they might injure competitor Purex was fairly 
clear. 
III. BOK'S SECTION 7 AND THE PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL 
RULEMAKING 
Post-Chamberlinian, product-differentiated markets were far 
more complex than classical and neoclassical markets. The eval-
uation of mergers in them was accordingly more complex as well. 
Product differentiation, economies of scale and distribution in 
71. 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970). 
72. See id. at 518. 
Id. 
The probable anticompetitive effects of [this] combination are significant. 
Blaw-Knox's design and construction capabilities and its position as a leading 
manufacturer of rolling mills, when coupled with Allis' position as the third larg-
est supplier of the electrical drive components for such mills, would result in 
Blaw-Knox becoming the only company capable of designing, producing and in-
stalling a complete metal rolling mill. The emergence of a company offering such 
a complete product would raise higher the already significant barriers to the en-
try of others . . . . 
73. 596 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1979) (remanding to district court for further proceedings), 
judgment for defendant aff'd, 664 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 983 
(1982). 
74. See supra text accompanying notes 66-70. 
75. 596 F.2d at 888. 
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firm size, barriers to new entry, and structural conduciveness to 
strategic behavior became increasingly relevant to merger policy. 
Most economists of Bok's day believed that this panoply of fac-
tors had to be taken into account in merger cases, for each factor 
was relevant to the thing the court was supposed to decide: 
whether, on balance, a merger was competitive or anticompeti-
tive. Bok argued that this insistence on analyzing every factor 
was unrealistic, given the institutional limitations of the courts.76 
Furthermore, it was unnecessary, for a few presumptive rules 
could produce reasonably accurate results. Bok suggested that 
the economists' hostility toward such simple rules sprang largely 
from criticisms of Supreme Court merger decisions of the 1930's 
and 1940's, which had disavowed any economic approach in 
merger cases, concentrating instead on such factors as the par-
ties' intent or fault.77 Bok believed that the Supreme Court was 
now ready for a merger policy with a bona fide economic con-
tent, provided it could be simply administered.78 
The antitrust bar and legal academics who knew something 
about economics had generally been siding with the economists 
and incorporating one complexity after another into merger 
analysis. One of the most important policy documents to show 
this influence is the 1955 Report of the Attorney General's Na-
tional Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws,79 composed by a 
large group of lawyers, law professors, and economists chaired 
by Stanley N. Barnes80 and S. Chesterfield Oppenheim.81 The 
Committee's statement on merger policy listed a complicated 
network of relevant factors to be taken into account, including 
the size of the companies and the size differences among compa-
nies in the market, the degree of vertical integration, the "uses 
of the product," and the "significance of the product under 
study in the output or in the purchases of different companies;" 
methods of sales and price interrelationships; barriers to entry; 
opportunities and techniques of product innovation; limitations 
on supply resources and economies of scale; and the "long-run 
supply and demand picture."82 No effort was made to assess the 
relative strength of these factors, to suggest whether all should 
76. Bok, supra note 9, at 347. 
77. See id. at 347-48. 
78. See id. at 348-49. 
79. REPORT, supra note 17. 
80. At that time, Barnes was head of the Antitrust Division of the Department of 
Justice. 
81. At that time, Oppenheim was a Professor of Law at the University of Michigan. 
82. REPORT, supra note 17, at 126. 
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be balanced against one another or whether some, such as ab-
sence of significant entry barriers, should be dispositive. No ef-
fort was even made to indicate how a court was supposed to col-
lect the information. "The really striking aspect of the 
discussion is the lack of any suggestion as to the manner in 
which these factors may be applied in any given case," Bok com-
plained of the report.83 Nevertheless, the Committee majority 
appeared quite confident that if courts and the enforcement 
agencies took this array of factors into account, merger analysis 
would be more accurate than it had been in the past.84 
"At the very heart of this paper," Bok wrote, "stands the con-
viction that economists, as well as lawyers, lack the knowledge to 
make predictions concerning the probable consequences of many 
... mergers .... "811 He then offered the rather startling con-
clusion that more information could actually make judicial deci-
sions about mergers less accurate,86 particularly if the informa-
tion were presented in the unstructured way suggested by the 
Attorney General's Committee. Although economic models 
might be correct in the abstract, the "normal theoretical 
problems" of measurement of the relevant factors, such as the 
degree of cost savings that a merger might produce or the extent 
of entry barriers, "become much more imposing when they arise 
in the context of litigation."87 Bok noted, for example, that econ-
omists were forever making simplifying "assumptions and rough 
judgments" and incorporating them as premises into their mod-
els in order to make the analysis less ambiguous.88 But the judge 
. cannot simply assume that the largest firm is the price leader, 
that the elasticity of demand is low, or that economies of scale 
are of this or that magnitude. Each of these elements must be 
83. Bok, supra note 9, at 257. 
84. The Committee then rather optimistically concluded: 
All of such facts cannot and need not be investigated in each case; only those 
relevant in particular market contexts, and obtainable at reasonable cost, should 
become a part of the record. In certain cases the relevant facts that can be ob-
tained at reasonable cost may still leave gaps in the information that would be 
helpful in reaching greater certainty as to the competitive consequences of an 
acquisition. While sufficient data to support a conclusion is required, sufficient 
data to give the enforcement agencies, the courts and business certainty as to 
competitive consequences would nullify the words "Where the effect may be" in 
the Clayton Act and convert them into "Where the effect is." 
REPORT, supra note 17, at 126. 
85. Bok, supra note 9, at 228. 
86. Id. at 295 ("[T]here are reasons for suspecting that a consideration of all relevant 
factors may actually detract from the accuracy of decisions made under section 7."). 
87. Id. at 290. 
88. Id. 
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established in a litigation process very poorly calculated to ar-
rive at economic truth.89 
Bok's own economic model for predicting the consequences of 
mergers was as complex as anyone's. 90 He distinguished, how-
ever, between "theoretical" and "empirical" modes of economic 
market analysis and suggested that merger policy needed to be 
guided largely by the latter. 91 Although the theoretical analysis 
was useful, it had practical application only to relatively gross 
changes in market structure. Even a large merger affected over-
all market structure in only modest ways.92 On the other hand, 
while the empirical studies lacked a framework and thus made 
generalization difficult, Bok believed they nevertheless had the 
capacity to make realistic predictions in specific cases. Unfortu-
nately, the state of empirical research was such that little useful 
information had been produced, except concerning very highly 
concentrated markets where most mergers would have been con-
demned anyway.93 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Bok 
noted that none of the economic models took into account the 
"wider range of [noneconomic] interests that to Congress 
seemed critically important" in merger analysis.94 
Bok was not the only person in 1960 to be concerned about 
the knowlege-assembling and economy-directing capabilities of 
governmental institutions. In fact, the 1950's and 1960's were 
decades of unprecedented soul-searching about regulatory gov-
ernment.05 That same year, SEC Chairman James M. Landis is-
sued his sharply critical Report on Regulatory Agencies to the 
President-Elect,96 noting the poor record of federal agencies in 
achieving their goals for a number of reasons, both political and 
organizational. 
By the time Bok wrote Section 7, government merger enforce-
ment agencies had already acknowledged their own limitations 
and attempted to simplify merger analysis. But the effort was 
89. See id. 
90. See, e.g., id. at 239 (discussing effects of product homogeneity on competition). 
91. Id. at 240. 
92. Id. at 241. 
93. Id. at 247. 
94. Id. at 248. 
95. See, e.g., M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 
(1955); H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETl'ER 
DEFINmON OF STANDARDS (1962); Friendly, A Look at the Federal Administrative Agen-
cies, 60 CoLUM. L. REV. 429 (1960); Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Com-
mission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467 (1952); see also T. 
MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 210-15 (1984). 
96. J. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (1960) 
(printed for the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.). 
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heavily influenced by the government's agenda, which, in 1960, 
was apparently to prevent as many mergers as possible. The An-
titrust Division had begun to rely on a single phrase in the 
House Report on the Celler-Kefauver Amendments to the effect 
that, under amended section 7, mergers were to be governed by 
the same test that the Supreme Court had developed for other 
sections of the Clayton Act.97 The other section that the Anti-
trust Division had in mind was section 3,98 which applied to tie-
ins and exclusive dealing agreements, both vertical arrange-
ments. The government wished to apply to both horizontal and 
vertical mergers the same "quantitative substantiality" test that 
the United States Supreme Court had established for exclusive 
dealing a year before the Celler-Kefauver amendments were 
passed.BB Under that test, a merger would presumably be illegal 
any time the acquired firm had a market share greater than six 
or seven percent.100 The government's argument was that be-
cause merger analysis was very complex, a simple presumptive 
rule was necessary for judicial administration.101 Why a rule that 
was assumed to work for vertical arrangements should be pre-
sumptively valid for horizontal mergers as well the government 
did not say. 
Bok agreed with the government's argument for a simple pre-
sumptive rule but believed that a more sophisticated one could 
be developed without producing the kinds of complexities that 
economists' analysis of mergers had come to entail. Most impor-
tantly, he seemed to have a commitment, not shared by the en-
forcement agencies, that "beneficial" mergers were possible and 
should be permitted or perhaps even encouraged.102 
97. See Brief After Trial for Plaintiff at 83, United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 
168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (No. 115-328) (relying on H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st 
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949) (stating that the tests under amended § 7 "are intended to be 
similar to those which the courts have applied in interpreting the same language as used 
in other sections of the Clayton Act")). 
98. 15 u.s.c. § 14 (1986). 
99. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 298 (1949) (establishing the 
test); see Handler, Quantitative Substantiality and the Celler-Kefauuer Act-A Look at 
the Record, 7 MERCER L. REV. 279 (1956) (concluding that Congress did not intend the 
quantitative substantiality test to be applied to mergers). 
100. Bok, supra note 9, at 250. Respecting horizontal mergers, such a test might indi-
cate illegality any time the postmerger firm's aggregate market share exceeded six or 
seven percent. 
101. Interestingly, the Federal Trade Commission responded that the quantitative 
substantiality test should not be applied in FTC merger cases because, as an administra-
tive agency, it had the power to make finer judgments than the courts. Id. at 250-51. 
Bok, however, found it irrational that two agencies having concurrent power to enforce 
§ 7 would use different standards. Id. at 251. 
102. Id. at 272-73. 
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On the question of economic and statistical information, Bok 
suggested that less is better than more, unless the additional in-
formation could be shown to make decisions reached in litigation 
more accurate. When information overload is a real threat and 
each piece of information indeterminate, knowing more does not 
necessarily mean more accurate decisions; in fact, it may under-
mine our ability to reach them.103 
All of this was complicated by the fact that merger policy was 
concerned with two different economic problems, which Bok 
identified as "dominance" and "concentration."10' The domi-
nance problem concerned the postmerger firm's ability to injure 
its rivals, while the concentration question considered the likeli-
hood of oligopoly pricing in the postmerger market. As noted 
above, 1011 Bok accepted the prevailing belief of the day that even 
horizontal mergers should be regarded as "exclusionary" prac-
tices. That is, the chief concern with them was not their short-
run ability to produce higher prices, but rather the power of the 
postmerger firm to injure rivals. Furthermore, he implicitly re-
lied on economic theories claiming that such practices were a 
threat at market shares much lower than they are currently be-
lieved to make single-firm monopoly pricing or tacit collusion 
possible. 
The presumption that the anticompetitive threat of horizontal 
mergers is principally "exclusionary" rather than "collusive" is 
generally the reverse of the one entertained today. Horizontal 
mergers in concentrated markets are condemned in the 1980's 
because of the threat of tacit coordination of prices when the 
postmerger firm's market share is substantially less than twenty 
percent. However, today few people would be concerned about 
predatory pricing by the postmerger firm unless it were very 
large, perhaps having a market share on the order of sixty per-
cent.106 As a result, any horizontal merger worthy of condemna-
tion as exclusionary would be condemned on ordinary collusion-
facilitating grounds. 
Bok believed that, in most cases, the threat of dominance was 
the greater one and that, as a result, presumptive merger rules 
should be concerned with "increases in the spread between the 
market shares of the first firm and its nearest competitor,mo7 
particularly if the acquiring firm was the largest firm in the mar-
103. See id. at 273. 
104. Id. at 279. 
105. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65. 
106. See P. AREEDA & H. HoVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ,r,r 711.2, 90l'c (Supp. 1988). 
107. Bok, supra note 9, at 281. 
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ket. His basic presumption was fundamentally hostile. Section 7 
was "most likely to achieve the objectives which underlay its 
amendment" if rules were drawn "in such a way that the bur-
dens of our ignorance fall upon the merging firms and not upon 
the public interest in maintaining competition and restraining 
monopoly power."108 Bok suggested that the dominant firm in a 
market should be forbidden from acquiring a firm with a market 
share of greater than two or three percent.109 When the acquir-
ing firm was not the dominant firm, then the danger of collusion 
became relatively more important, and the danger of dominance 
became relatively less. Even here, Bok felt obliged to yield to the 
Congressional understanding that growing concentration was as 
problematic in "fragmented" industries as it was in "highly 
oligopolized" ones. 110 As a result, merger policy should be con-
cerned relatively less with absolute concentration in the market 
affected by the merger, and relatively more with the increases 
that result from the merger itself. Thus, a merger that increased 
the market share of the postmerger firm by seven percent, in a 
market where no premerger firm had a market share higher than 
ten percent, was more suspect than a merger in a market with 
three firms with twenty percent each, but which increased the 
postmerger firm's market share by only four or five percent. Fur-
ther, Bok believed that, since oligopoly was inherently a phe-
nomenon that looked at all the firms in a market and not merely 
at the parties to a merger, it would be very difficult to devise a 
test based principally on the fear of increased likelihood of oli-
gopoly pricing. m 
Likewise, Bok wrote into his rules Congress's concern with 
concentration trends, 112 suggesting that mergers should be more 
suspect in markets that had steadily been growing more concen-
trated. As critics of the Warren Court era merger policy have 
pointed out, 113 concentration trends often indicate that, owing to 
changes in technology or modes of distribution, economies of 
scale in a particular industry are more substantial than they had 
been previously. The result is that the market has room for 
fewer optimally sized firms than before, and it will experience a 
"trend" toward concentration by either exit or merger until 
108. Id. at 307-08. 
109. Id. at 308. 
110. Id. at 310. 
111. Id. at 311. 
112. See id. at 314-16. 
113. For discussion, see H. HoVENKAMP, supra note 26, at§ 11.6; IV P. AREEDA & D. 
TURNER, supra note 69, 11 914, at 82 n.5 (1980). 
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equilibrium is restored. Bok suggested that no merger by large 
firms other than the dominant firm should be permitted if the 
combined market shares of the two to eight largest firms114 after 
the merger were increased by seven to eight percent or more 
over shares existing five to ten years before the merger.m Under 
this rule, all premerger increases in concentration, whether by 
expansion or acquisition, were treated more or less alike. 
Bok suggested a presumptive rule that no acquisition of a firm 
with a market share larger than five percent be permitted.116 
Bok also would have included a provision against a merger with 
a particularly "disturbing" firm that was forcing competition in 
the market, if the purpose of the merger was to eliminate that 
firm's competition.117 In the Maryland & Virginia Milk Produc-
ers Association case, 118 the Supreme Court condemned a merger 
under this theory. A similar "disruptive" firm provision is writ-
ten into the 1984 Justice Department Merger Guidelines.119 
Finally, Bok attempted to account for Congress's concern that 
acquisitions of failing firms be permitted, lest those firms be 
driven out of business, even if such acquisitions would violate 
the presumptive merger rules he had suggested. Bok noted that 
the defense would often be raised against government merger 
challenges unless it were limited so as to permit acquisition only 
of firms likely to fail if the acquisition had not occurred.120 Bok 
suggested that prediction of business failure was generally easier 
than the prediction of the impact of a merger on competition, 
and that the greater the risk that the merger would injure com-
petition, the stronger the evidence must be that the acquired 
firm was failing. 121 He also believed that the defense should be 
rejected presumptively if there were alternative prospective buy-
ers for the failing firm, unless those buyers intended to use the 
114. Bok permitted the government to select the number, provided that the number 
selected included the acquiring firm. Bok, supra note 9, at 313. 
115. Id. at 313-18. 
116. Id. at 328. Compare George Stigler's proposals in Stigler, Mergers and Preven-
tive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 176, 182 (1955), which would have forbidden per 
se any acquisition yielding a postmerger market share exceeding 20%, and permitted any 
merger yielding a postmerger firm whose market share was less than 5 to 10%. In be-
tween, mergers were to be studied by the agencies on a case-by-case basis. 
117. Bok, supra note 9, at 323-24. 
118. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960). 
119. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 1984 Merger Guidelines, § 3.44(c) 
(horizontal mergers), § 4.222 (nonhorizontal mergers), 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1984). 
120. Bok, supra note 9, at 342. 
121. Id. at 343. 
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firm's productive assets in a different market, or to scrap 
them.122 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Bok's Section 7 was cited by the Supreme Court in six merger 
decisions123 and numerous times by the lower courts. 124 Many of 
the Supreme Court decisions citing Bok are on nearly everyone's 
short list of repudiated Warren Court antitrust decisions to-
122. Id. at 345-47. 
123. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 507 (1974) (citing Bok 
on the failing company defense); Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 
136 n.2 (1969) (including in a string cite on the failing company defense a cite to Bok, 
supra note 9, at 339); FTC v. Procter and Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 588-89 (1967) 
(Harlan, J., concurring) ("It is also argued that the large company generates psychologi-
cal pressure which may force smaller ones to follow its pricing policies, and that its very 
presence in the market may discourage entrants or make lending institutions unwilling 
to finance them." (citing Bok, supra note 9, at 275)); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 
384 U.S. 270, 287 n.12, 301 n.33 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing Bok for support of 
the premise that a decline in the number of competitors does not necessarily entail a 
reduction in competition and for the proposition that too harsh a merger rule will dis-
courage future, efficiency-producing mergers); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 
374 U.S. 321, 362-64 (1963) (relying in part on Bok for the development of presumptive 
standards); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 312 n.19 (1962) (citing Bok 
for a review of the legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver amendments); see also 
Baker & Blumenthal, The 1982 Guidelines and Preexisting Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 311, 
333 n.83 (1983) (concluding that the Supreme Court's analysis in Philadelphia Nat'l 
Bank "owes a substantial intellectual debt" to Bok's article, because of its adoption of a 
simple prima facie test for the legality of mergers). 
124. Included among these are: Kaiser _Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. FTC, 652 F.2d 
1324, 1333 (7th Cir. 1981) (noting that 1950 amendments call for stricter scrutiny of 
mergers than the old Clayton Act did); United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 
606 n.32 (6th Cir. 1970) (comparing academic discussions of the failing company de-
fense); A. G. Spalding & Bros. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585, 625 n.34 (3d Cir. 1962) (relying on 
Bok for the court's refusal to transplant the "quantitative substantiality" doctrine from 
§ 3 of the Clayton Act to§ 7); Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 826 n.31, 
830 n.39 (9th Cir. 1961) (discussing the "quantitative substantiality" doctrine and the 
effect on competition of loss of one substantial firm in the market); Erie Sand & Gravel 
Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279, 281 (3d Cir. 1961) (discussing the failing company defense); 
United States v. Black and Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 782 n.97 (D. Md. 1976) 
(discussing the failing company defense); United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 
95 (D. Colo. 1975) (discussing the failing company defense); Kirihara v. Bendix Corp., 
306 F. Supp. 72, 87 n.56 (D. Haw. 1969) (discussing the legislative history of the Celler-
Kefauver amendments concerned with protecting small business); United States v. Prov-
ident Nat'l Bank, 280 F. Supp. 1, 9-10 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (discussing numerous factors rele-
vant to merger analysis); United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. 
Supp. 867,929 n.170 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (string citation); id. at 941 n.198 (suggesting a five-
to ten-year period over which to observe merger history to determine whether undue 
increases in concentration are likely); United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 
530, 551 (W.D. Pa. 1963) (discussing the effect on competition of loss· of one substantial 
firm). 
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day,1211 but several of those citations were not to Bok's substan-
tive proposals. The 1968 Merger Guidelines issued by the De-
partment of Justice also show strong influence from Bok.128 
These Guidelines, which were not revised until the 1982 Guide-
lines replaced them, were an important guide to Antitrust Divi-
sion merger enforcement policy for several years, although their 
influence waned in the 1970's.127 Unlike Bok, who was much 
more concerned with single-firm dominance than with the likeli-
hood of collusion in the postmerger market, the Guidelines ex-
pressed equal concern with both, albeit ambiguously. According 
to the Guidelines, the principal purposes of horizontal merger 
policy were: 
(i) preventing elimination as an independent business en-
tity of any company likely to have been a substantial 
competitive influence in a market; (ii) preventing any 
company or small group of companies from obtaining a 
position of dominance in a market; (iii) preventing signif-
icant increases in concentration in a market; and (iv) pre-
serving significant possibilities for eventual deconcentra-
tion in a concentrated market.128 
The Department's policy on mergers in markets exhibiting a 
trend toward concentration during those years appears to have 
been lifted straight from Bok's article: 
Such a trend [toward concentration] is considered to be 
present when the aggregate market share of any grouping 
of the largest firms in the market from the two largest to 
the eight largest has increased by approximately 7 % or 
125. E.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
126. U.S. Dep't of Just., Merger Guidelines - 1968, reprinted in 2 Trade Reg. Rep. 
(CCH) 11 13,101, at 20,521-28 [hereinafter Merger Guidelines]. 
127. Thomas E. Kauper, head of the Antitrust Division from 1972 to 1976, recalls 
that the Division paid "little attention" to the Guidelines during that period. "We were 
well aware that the Guidelines needed revision, but in the Watergate period, with a 
weakened administration, that did not seem a politically sensible thing to do." 
Professor Kauper also noted: 
[W]hat strikes me is that Bok's piece had a significant impact on the decision to 
issue guidelines at all. Bok's willingness to point the way to the use of numerical 
standards, it seems to me, really set the stage for the issuance of a set of guide-
lines which made some degree of sense and had some element of practicality to 
them. 
Letter from Thomas E. Kauper to Herbert Hovenkamp (Mar. 4, 1988) (copy on file with 
u. MICH. JL. REF.). 
128. Merger Guidelines, supra note 126, at 20,523. 
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more of the market over a period of time extending from 
any base year 5-10 years prior to the merger .... The 
Department will ordinarily challenge any acquisition, by 
any firm in a grouping of such largest firms showing the 
requisite increase in market share, of any firm whose 
market share amounts to approximately 2% or more.129 
The Guidelines' basic market-share standards for assessing hori-
zontal mergers show Bok's influence only a little less. Like Bok, 
the Department was more concerned with the market share of 
the merging partners than with the underlying level of market 
concentration. It accorded "primary significance to the size of 
the market share held by both the acquiring and the acquired 
firms."130 The Guidelines, however, regarded mergers in highly 
concentrated markets as somewhat more suspicious than those 
in unconcentrated markets and proposed harsher standards for 
evaluating them.131 The differences were not dramatic except in 
the case of very large firms. In a highly concentrated market, for 
example, the Department would permit a firm with a ten per-
cent market share to acquire only a firm whose market share was 
two percent or less, while, in a "less highly concentrated" mar-
ket, the ten percent firm could acquire a firm as large as four 
percent. But, in highly concentrated markets, any firm holding 
greater than a fifteen percent market share would be prohibited 
from acquiring even the tiniest firm, while, in a less concen-
trated market, that prohibition applied only to acquiring firms 
whose market shares exceeded twenty-five percent. Finally, the 
Department appeared to accept Bok's proposal that no firm be 
permitted to acquire a firm whose market share exceeded five 
percent, 132 and his proposal that acquisitions by "disruptive" 
firms with a history of forcing competition in a market be 
viewed with greater hostility.133 
In their influential treatise, Antitrust Law, Areeda and Tur-
ner explicitly rejected Bok's proposal that courts should be 
much more hostile toward mergers in markets exhibiting a trend 




132. See id. (discussing the market share standards). 
133. Id. at 20,524. 
134. IV P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 69, at 11 914. 
SUMMER 1988] Law and Economics 539 
amount of concentration in a market was not particularly rele-
vant to merger policy, except in close cases.1311 
Most of the earlier citations to Bok's work were "expansion-
ist"-that is, they cited Section 7 for its analysis of the legisla-
tive history of the 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendments or as a jus-
tification for using market share evidence to condemn 
mergers.138 Recent decisions, on the other hand, have cited Bok's 
article for its conclusions about the inability of courts to deal 
with difficult economic issues unless the courts are willing to 
make certain simplifying assumptions.137 
Bok's single law review article enjoyed an extraordinary 
amount of influence. That its influence today is less than it was 
two decades ago in no way diminishes the great achievement of 
Bok's Section 7. It demonstrates only that economic science as 
well as law presents the antitrust policymaker with questions of 
both value and fact; the changes that antitrust policy has exper-
ienced since 1960 are mainly a revolution of value. 
135. See id. at 1111 912-913. 
136. See supra notes 123-24 (listing of decisions citing Bok's article). 
137. See, e.g., United Air Lines v. CAB, 766 F.2d 1107, 1121 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, 
J.); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITI Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983) (Breyer, 
J.); see also United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963), (relying 
on Bok for the proposition that economic data are "complex and elusive" and that busi-
nessmen must be able to "assess the legal consequences of a merger with some confi-
dence"). In the process, the Court developed virtual per se rules based on market share; 
in this case, a postmerger market share of 30% was too high. Id. at 364-65. The test 
proposed by C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 16, at 133, was postmerger market 
share exceeding 20%, as was the test proposed by Stigler, supra note 116. Bok had not 
developed an equivalent rule based on postmerger market share alone. 

